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Lawson: Lawson: Limited Liability

LIMITED LIABILITY*
F. H.

LAWSON**

One of the main objects of legal education is to train lawyers to think
on preconceived, established lines, so that they may argue among themselves intelligibly and without wasting time and energy on fundamentals;
another, contradictory aim is to accustom an 6lite to look at law critically
and if necessary to question traditional views on rational grounds. One useful teaching method is to shake the student out of his accustomed ways and
to force him to reconsider the categories of thought characteristic of his
own legal system by reference to those of other systems. That sort of teaching is especially a function of comparative lawyers. I propose, therefore, as a
comparative lawyer, to draw for the benefit of an 6lite of lawyers and laymen a cross-section through legal systems that has not, to my knowledge,
been drawn before. You will find the topic of limited liability discussed
sporadically in widely different context, but not, I believe, made the subject of a generalization based on historical and comparative study. I propose
to trace some of its ramifications, in the hope of detecting in them a coherent pattern.
I make no apology for starting with Roman law. Most of the essential
problems and the means of dealing with them are already there. The products of Roman analysis could, if properly and imaginatively used, be made
to solve our modern problems also.
Early Roman law was very hard on debtors. Once certain procedural
'safeguards had been satisfied, the debtor was subjected to the physical
control of his creditor, who could confine him in his private prison, but was
probably forced to allow him to work off his debt. Even after the roughness
of the procedure was alleviated, the power of the creditor remained intact.
*This paper was delivered as the R. B. Price Lecture at the Edna Nelson
'Dinner given in honor of the editors of the Missouri Law Review on April 26, 1968.

.The lecturer has since added the footnotes.

**Professor Emeritus of Comparative Law, Oxford University; SecretaryGeneral of the International Association of Legal Science; Fellow of the British
Academy; Lecturer in Law at the Universities of Lancaster and Manchester; Barrister at Law of Gray's Inn, MA., D.C.L., Oxford; Hon. LL.D., Glasgow; Dr. Jur.,
Frankfurt; Docteur en Droit, Paris and Louvain and Ghent. Formerly Visiting Professor of Law at the Universities of California (Berkeley), Houston, Michigan,
Pennsylvania, and at New York University.
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But it would seem that this method of enforcement was of little use against
insolvent debtors; it was a way of putting pressure on the solvent. 1 If it was
necessary to proceed against a debtor's property, one would have expected
to find some procedure analogous to a sheriff's sale, a public officer being
authorized to enter upon the property and seize enough to cover the debt.
Republican Rome, however, had no such officer-it left its citizens to enforce their rights themselves-and, moreover, the debtor was probably assumed to be insolvent. In that case it would be unfair to apply the principle
of "First come, first served"; and so the debtor's property was sold en masse
2
to the creditor who promised the other creditors the highest dividend.
It is important to note that the debtor was not thereby discharged
from liability to pay the residue of his debts. I need not pursue the matter
further, including some rather obscure relaxations of the hardships to which
he was still subject, and which correspond roughly to the modem exemptions
from full execution, such as bedding, tools of trade-there was nothing so
generous as the homestead exemption. 3 Although in the end the debtor
might not pay the whole of his debts, it was these obstacles that prevented
the creditors from effecting a complete execution. The judgment that each
had obtained was for the whole debt. Since it was the execution, not the
liability, that was limited, they are not strictly germane to my subject.
Nevertheless, true instances of limited liability do occur in Roman law.
Some of the most interesting are concerned with succession on death.
There was no personal representative in Roman law.4 The successor,
whether by will or on an intestacy, was always an heir, and stepped into
the shoes of the deceased for all purposes, apart from the liabilities which
died with the deceased. Hence he sued in his own right to recover debts
due to the deceased and was fully liable for the debts owed by him. Some
heirs could indeed always refuse to enter and so did not succeed. Others
gradually acquired the right to abstain. The only heir who could not refuse
was a slave of the testator, who was at the same time given his freedom.
He automatically became heir and assumed the liabilities of the testator.
He thereby incurred the disgrace of insolvency which would otherwise have
fallen on his master. It was indeed the practice to substitute a slave as heir
in case an inheritance turned out to be insolvent and for that reason the
1. W. BUCKLAND, A
643 (2d ed. 1932).
2. Ibid.
3. Id. at 645.
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instituted heirs abstained. No doubt as a reward for his services as liquidator
of the inheritance, he was allowed, in contrast to other bankrupts, to retain
any property he acquired subsequently. In other words, his liability was
limited to the value of the inheritance he had acquired.
You may ask why any fuss should be made of this arrangement; was
the deceased not really paying his own debts through the agency of his
former slave? That would be to misunderstand completely the Roman point
of view. The whole point was that the ex-slave became owner of the inheritance and succeeded to all the claims and liabilities included in it. It
was a genuine case of a person's liability being limited to a separate estate
or fund or account-call it what you will.
At a much later date Justinian introduced another technique which resembles the Common Law method of administering a decedent estate
through a personal representative. An heir might enter on an inheritance
and, within a short period, make an inventory of the inheritance. Thereupon, although he would recover in his own right all debts due to the deceased,
he became liable to pay the debts of the deceased only to the extent of the
inheritance. The so-called benefit of inventory has survived into the modern
Civil law. A Civil lawyer considers an heir who takes advantage of it to
enjoy a limitation of his liability; whereas a Common lawyer regards the
personal representative as an agent to carry out the actual or presumed
wishes of the deceased, including the administration of his estate.6
The separation of estates enjoyed by the slave freed and instituted in
a will had, at a much earlier date, been applied to the converse case where
an insolvent person became heir to a solvent estate and the creditors of the
estate were afraid that it would become insolvent in the hands of the heir.
They could apply to have the merger prevented. Here, it seems to me, we
have a distinct advance; it is not a case of protecting the heir against the
deceased's creditors, but of protecting one set of creditors against another
-set of creditors.
It may be urged that in all these cases the separation of one estate
from another was of very short duration and was intended only to prevent
a merger of two estates each of which constituted the entire property of a
person. There was therefore no question of credit being given to anything
less than the entire estate of a debtor. One cannot speak of credit being
given to a separate account.
And yet the notion of a separate fund or account which bears only its
g. Id.

at 241.
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own debts goes back to ancient times. The pecidiun that a master gave to
hi$ slave or a father to his son was essentially an account, which alone could
be touched to pay debts incurred by the slave or son in connection with it.
A few words about the origin of what would at first sight appear to be a
strange institution will not be out of place.
A Roman of full age all of whose male ancestors were dead might well
have subject to his absolute power many descendants belonging to many
generations, for a Roman did not escape from ancestral control at majority.
Moreover, he might own slaves, some of whom might be Greeks or Levantines experienced in business who had passed through the slave markets
after capture by pirates. Now if he was a person of some wealth he might
not wish to manage all his affairs himself; and, in any case, if he was a senator, he could not engage in trade. Hence it was very natural for him to split
up his property into several parts, each of which he would entrust to the
management of one of his free descendants or slaves, drawing perhaps a
portion of the profits from each undertaking.
So long as his descendants or slaves remained in his power, they could
own nothing, and all they acquired became his property. 6 In strict law they
could bind other parties to him but could not bind him to other parties, on
the principle that they could make his position better but not worse. Obviously at that rate no one would do business with them on credit, and so
special actions could be brought against him in which the judgment was
limited to the contents at the time of judgment of the fund entrusted to
the particular person who had entered into the transaction. The fund
was known as a pecidium.
If one pauses for a moment to ask why the liability was so limited,
one will see that it could only be on the footing that the plaintiff had given
credit not to the defendant personally but to the particular account constituted by the peculium. Moreover, several accounts of the same person
would be separately operated at the same time, in respect of each of
which he could incur liabilities limited to the balance of the account
at the time of judgment. What is the pecsdium but a prototype of the
modern business corporation? In a business sense that is true, but there
is a very important legal difference in that the corporation is a separate
artificial person interposed for convenience between the stockholder and
6. Id. at 70, 202. I have inserted a hypothetical case arising out of business
transactions by slaves in A ROMAN LAW READER, to be published shortly by
Oceana Publications, Inc.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss4/1
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his customer; and hence each fund represented at Roman law by a pecidiun
would be the capital of a distinct person.
Artificial or corporate personality was indeed known to the Romans,
who have been credited with its invention. Most corporations were public
or semi-public in character; there was however one type of corporation
that engaged in business, the joint-stock partnership of publicans, or taxfarmers, who used it in order to operate with limited liability. 7
To sum up, Roman law had already developed relaxations of liability
to pay a judgment debt, separations of estates to avoid merger and in
order to limit a person's liability to debts he had incurred personally, the
recognition that a person might constitute separate funds, each of which
would be saddled only with its own liabilities, and, finally, the joint-stock
partnership operating with limited liability. Any further progress that has
been made has been in the direction of detailed elaboration and the application of those techniques to new situations.
I should add that the Romans had developed highly sophisticated
means of security, analogous to mortgage, pledge and guarantee, which
afforded them better ways of collecting debts, and acted in direct opposition
to limited liability.
For the time being some of the methods of limiting liability disappeared
with the end of the ancient world and the lapse of Western Europe into
a barbarism incapable of using refined legal methods. The separation of the
freedman's after-acquired property from the inheritance disappeared of
course with slavery, which also excluded the slave's peculi m. The peculiwm
of a free descendant subject to power disappearel when, in contrast to
Roman practice, his ancestor lost his power over him on hig attaining
majority. Thereafter he did business as a principal. Thus the peczdium
no longer had any function to perform. Of course it remained in the Roman
texts for anyone to see; it is very prominent in Justinian's Institutes,
which every student had to learn. But quite obviously professors of the
Civil law would not devote much attention to such an obsolete institution,
nor would their students be prepared to listen to them if they did. There is
very little about it in the great nineteenth century German treatises,
which expounded Roman law as applied in large parts of Germany. 8
7. P. DUFF, PERSONALITY IN ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 159-61 (1938).
8. II WINDSCHEID, LEHBUCH DES PANDEKTENREcHTS §§ 289, 484

(8th ed.

1906). The editor notes that the so called actiones adiectitiae qualitatis, of which
the actio de pecidio was one, are not to be found in the German Civil Code, which
came into force in 1900.
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There were, however, some very interesting developments in the
Middle Ages, mainly in connection with married women's property and
commercial law.
What are called by Civil lawyers matrimonial r6gimes are of almost
inconceivable complexity and variety,9 but one very important class has
many features in common, the most interesting of which for our purpose
is the reservation of separate property to each spouse combined with a
pooling of the rest in a so-called 'community,' the administration of which
is entrusted to the husband.
It has always been difficult to characterize the community according
to the categories of the Civil law. A Common lawyer would regard it as
a fund, in the sense that it preserves its identity although some or all of
its component elements have changed; it is not expected, or even intended,
that they should remain unchanged. It would probably be vested in a
trustee for purposes of management. That is impossible in the Civil law.
It is in fact uncertain whether the community property is owned by the
husband, subject to a duty to share it with his wife at the termination of
the marriage, or by the spouses jointly. If the latter is the correct view, then
the husband can burden his wife's share with liabilities, as he can his own.
But he cannot subject his wife's separate property to liability. Accordingly,
whatever the correct construction, if we look at the matter from the
wife's point of view, any liability he subjects her to is limited to her share
of the community.
It has been just as difficult to keep commercial law within the categories established for Civil law; but it has not been so necessary as where
matrimonial rdgimes are concerned, for commercial law has usually been
administered by merchants in their own courts, as was once the case in
England also. Throughout the Middle Ages and what we are learning to
call the Early Modern Period, many of the transactions of merchants were
governed by the Law Merchant, which was developed by the practice of
merchants throughout the western world. Although it varied from place to
place, it was for the most part international. Some of the most important
development took place in Italy, where the refinements of commercial intercourse appeared at an early stage in such city republics as Venice and
9. M. WOLFF, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 355-358 (2d ed. 1955). MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY LAW 3-235 (W. Friedmann ed. 1955). There have since been
.many changes; for France see AMos AND WALTON'S INTRODucTION TO FRENCH
LAw 379-392 (F. Lawson, A. Anton, L. Neville Brown ed. 1967); for Germany see 1
E. COHN, MANUAL OF GERMAN LAW 236-241 (1968).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss4/1
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Genoa. One of the new institutions which came from them was the

Com'menda.10
The Commenda was a form of limited partnership, in which one or
more of the partners, the active partners, managed the business, and one
or more partners were sleeping partners who merely supplied funds and
shared in the profits and in the losses so far as their contribution extended.
If they meddled with the management, they became fully and personally
liable, like the active partners. That was of course a perfect example of
limited liability. The sleeping partners could be sued as partners, but could
be made liable only to the extent of their investment. Limited partnership
on the lines of the Com'menda has flourished in the Civil law countries.
In the Common law countries it was introduced late, and, except in some
places for special purposes, has not really taken root. We have used either
the trust or the corporation.
We must therefore devote some consideration to the trust."1 The first
trusts were arrangements by which a trustee was given land to hold for the
benefit of another person, the beneficiary. They were what we call fixed
trusts, that is to say, the trustee had no power to alienate that particular
piece of land. Trusts of movable property were of later origin, and became important only with the development of securities such as stocks
and shares. Trustees then came to be burdened with ever increasing active
duties, among which was that of varying the investments subject to the
trust. When that became common, it gradually became clear that the
beneficiary had interests, not in specific things, but in an abstract fund.
He was entitled to an income from capital managed by others. That is
probably now the normal case, though the beneficiary may be allowed the
possession of physical objects, such as land, comprised in the fund and
to manage them himself so as to produce an income from them.
Whenever a trustee is invested with powers of management, there are
at least two accounts, the trustee's personal account and the trust account.
If the trustee contracts as trustee, to the knowledge of the other party,
he binds the trust account but not himself; if, on the other hand, he
contracts personally, he does not bind the trust account. There is of
course a danger that he may mix the two accounts. Solutions have then
been adopted that favour the beneficiary against the creditor of an insolvent trustee, and which, as the great legal historian Maitland, who
10. 1 W. Howswoam, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 195-197 (1922-1938).
11. See generally A. Scorr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS (2d ed. 1956).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1968
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was also an experienced equity lawyer, long ago recognized, raise certain
moral difficulties.12 I shall say no more of them, for they have become
less important recently. The single private trustee is rare. Normally he
has associated with him a lawyer or a bank affiliate. The latter is very
unlikely to become insolvent, and in any case the accounts held by it
must be insured; in some jurisdictions at least, there is a guarantee fund
to cover the former's defalcations. 13
Since the title to the contents of both the trustee's personal account
and of the trust account is in the trustee, actions may be brought against
him personally and as trustee. In either case his liability is limited, for the
creditor cannot touch the trust fund in the one case or make the trustee
personally liable in the other.
Once the trust was fully developed, a means existed of giving a married woman property which she could manage and enjoy independently
of her husband, and incur debts in connection with it.14 The property was
vested in trustees for her separate use. But she could not bind herself
personally. She could only bind her separate property, or, to put it another way, she could be made liable only to the extent of her separate
property. It was a genuine case of limited liability. In more recent times,
married women have been enabled by statute to acquire and hold separate property without the intervention of a trust, but with a contractual
capacity limited to their separate property. They can however render
themselves personally liable, and even be made bankrupt, if they engage
in trade on their own account.
Limited liability came at first into business by a different road. 15
Large scale operations, especially in distant foreign trade, required the
combination of large numbers of persons, not all of whom could take part
in management, and, after experiments had been made of different kinds,
the normal device came to be that of the joint stock company, in which
the several members invested and took stock in a separate corporate
person which conducted business through its agents. Where that tech12. F. MAITLAND, EqurIY 175 (1936).
13. 3 STEPHEN'S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
1950). Solicitors Act of 1941, 4 & 5 Geo. 6, c. 46, s. 2.

14. For a classical account see A. Dicay,

371-395 (2d ed. 1920); for later developments
271-274 (3d ed. 1966).

ENGLAND

247 (21st ed.

LAW AND OPINION IN ENGLAND
see P. BROMLEY, FAMILY LAW

15. 4 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 319-321 (1922-1938). 8
W. HOLDSWORTH, Id. at 192-222; C. COOKE, CORPORATION, TRUST, AND COMPANY
(1951); R. STEVENS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 1-10 (2d
ed. 1949).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss4/1
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nique was adopted, the corporation itself contracted debts, and not the
stockholders, each of whom stood to lose his investment and nothing more.
For a long time such a corporation could be created only by charter
from the Crown or by Act of Parliament. If a number of persons pooled
their investments and purported to trade as an unincorporated company,
they could only be partners, and made themselves personally subject to
unlimited liability for the debts of the company. On the whole it was not
difficult to induce the Crown or Parliament to incorporate companies
until the South Sea Bubble made necessary a general consideration of
financial methods. Then such serious obstacles were placed in the way of
incorporation that careful financiers began to look to the trust as a possible
remedy. It was found that, if proper precautions were taken, the promoters could contract on behalf of the company without making themselves liable beyond the amount they held as trustees for themselves and
the other investors. Occasionally that device has survived in order to
evade special restrictions. I understand, for instance, that it is still impossible for a corporation to deal commercially with land in Massachusetts,
and use has had to be made of the Massachusetts trust. I well remember
my surprise at seeing the signature of a trustee at the foot of a document
granting me a tenancy of an apartment in Lexington Hall, Cambridge. I
expected him to be designated as director or manager.
The rest of that story is reasonably well known. Starting with a
Connecticut statute of 1846, legislation in many countries has made it
possible for promoters to incorporate companies without specific authorization from either executive or legislature, but with limited liability of their
members. That legislation has been the main basis of our immense law of
business corporations, about which, as a non-expert, I propose to say no
more.
A pedantic lawyer might complain that I am speaking inaccurately
when I say that the liability of a stockholder in a corporation is limited,
at any rate once he has paid up the full value of his stock. It is the corporation that contracts the debts incurred in the conduct of the business,
and the liability of the corporation is not limited in the strict sense of the
term, since all its assets can be attached to satisfy its creditors. The same objection could be made to the popular term current in England, 'limited liability company,' or 'limited company.' In fact, unless the word 'limited'
occurs in the correspondence with persons doing business with the company, the stockholders are personally liable on any debts incurred by the
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1968
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company. Hence the legislator regards the limitation as a limitation on the
liability of the stockholders. Surely that is the truth: the interposition of
an abstract entity, the corporation, between the stockholders and their
customers is a mere convenience adopted to facilitate their dealings with
them. In fact, though not in law, the corporation is their agent.
How can these various forms of limited liability be justified? Would
it not be fairer and more in accord with business morality that the law
should invariably apply the French principle that the whole of a person's
property is charged with the debts incurred by him or on his behalf? The
most obvious answer is that if a person gives credit to another person
knowing that that person's liability is subject to a limitation, he is assuming the risk of that limitation.
We may go further and say, first, that if he is not willing to take
that risk but still wants to do business with the other person, he can try
to obtain security; and there is a whole battery of security devices which
enable a person to isolate one transaction from all others and make certain that he will not be saddled with a bad debt, whatever may happen
to other creditors. This is regular in banking practice. If a person does
business in corporate form and asks for a loan to be made to the corporation, a banker will usually ask for his personal guarantee and possibly for
that of other persons.
Second, all round security might well cause an arrest in the flow of
business; wise speculation is a necessary part of capitalism. If a stockholder
risks the investment he makes by subscribing for his stock, why should
not the creditor risk the investment he makes in his contract with the
debtor?
Third, it is fair to say that business men, either in general or in a
particular line of business, are all members of a single community engaged
in pushing the economy forward. They are, in a sense, whether creditors or
debtors, all partners in common enterprises. That is as true of capitalist
economies as of socialist economies, though the fact may not be very apparent. It is not advisable to encourage a person to cut himself off from
the rest. There should be a reasonable apportionment of risks, and one
form of it is limited liability.
These considerations obviously apply to contract, where liability results from the giving of credit. Are they appropriate to tort? One's initial
judgment would be that in tort, limited liability not only cannot be justified
but does not exist.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss4/1
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And yet limited liability has long existed in maritime law.16 In some
countries a shipowner is allowed to abandon a ship that has caused a
collision, a custom that has been traced, somewhat spuriously, to a rule
of Roman law that allowed a master to escape liability for his slave's
wrongful act by surrendering him to the victim. Another custom, now,
with varying modifications, in more frequent use, limited the liability to a
conventional sum amounting to so much per ton of the ship's weight.
Analogous limitations exist under the Warsaw Convention for aircraft.
How are we to justify such rules? They are usually thought to be
means of encouraging maritime enterprise, by reducing the risks attendant on it. Perhaps a more convincing explanation is to be found in the
notion of community, already mentioned in connection with contract.
All persons engaged in navigation and maritime trade can be treated as
forming a well-defined community, which they have voluntarily entered
in awareness of the risks involved, and which they may from time to time
cause or suffer damage. Moreover, the rules come from a time when, although
insurance of the ship was of long standing, insurance against liability did
not yet exist.
On the whole, the Common law systems have been hypocritically
slow to admit the connection between liability insurance and tort. Some
of the Civil law systems have been more candid, as I hope to show from
a draft code which displays some of the most advanced thought on the
subject.
The Dutch have been at work since the end of the War on a new
Civil Code. The Sixth Book of their new Code deals with the Law of
Contract, Tort and Enrichment; it is still only in draft, of which fortunately there is a provisional English translation. The draftsmen have
made use of all the experience that was accessible to them, including,
perhaps surprisingly, that of the Common law countries. They have tried
to follow the dictates of common sense and have not been over-respectful
to tradition.
The draftsmen have adopted the modern notion, first found in the
Swiss Revised Code of Obligations, which empowers a judge in certain
circumstances to reduce the damages awarded against a defendant if a
full award would reduce him to extremities. However, the draftsmen add
the proviso that that is not to be done if the defendant has "not covered
16. G. RoBINsoN,
950 (1939).

HANDBOOK OF ADMIRALTY LAW IN THE UNTED STATES
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his liability with insurance although he was bound to do so."' t Then, after
prescribing strict liability, that is, irrespective of fault, for certain accidents,
the draft continues:
If a person is liable under the foregoing articles without a tort
being attributable to him, then the court may mitigate the compensation according to the circumstances in so far as the liability was
not covered by insurance and the debtor was not bound to take out
such cover.'8
So far, so good; but what if the possible damage is so enormous that it
cannot be fully covered? The draft continues:
Amounts may be fixed by legislative decree which the liability
xeferred to in the foregoing paragraph is not to exceed, if without
such limitation it could not reasonably be covered by insurance. 19
Accordingly, what appears at first sight to be only an indulgence to
the defendant turns out to be mainly a means of forcing, and at the same
time enabling, operators of certain kinds to take out liability insurance.
But we have still to decide in what circumstances a person ought to take
out liability insurance. There must, I think, be some limits, and I suggest
that the open-ended provision of the draft would have to be applied to
persons likely to find themselves involved in typical accidents, and who
might therefore be regarded as belonging to a fairly well-defined community. In other cases, there is a discretionary limitation of liability.
Limitation may be attained by other means which, though not avowedly limitations on liability, give very much the same results. One of the
most difficult branches of the law of torts regulates what we have come
to call the measure of damages. Granted that the defendant has, by his
negligent act or omission, caused to the plaintiff damage A, which he ought
to have foreseen, and which led successively to damage B, C, D and so
on, how far should the liability extend? Do we stop where foreseeability
ends, or do we apply some other criterion, such as directness, which may
let in damage B or some more remote damage? The latest English author20
ity
has swung in favor of the foreseeability test, though difficulties still
remain. The truth is that any solution is bound to cause hardship to either
the plaintiff or the defendant, or their insurers.
17. Draft Civil Code, 6.1.9.7.
18. Id., 6.3.17.1.
19. Id., 6.3.17.2.
20. Overseas Tankship (U.K.), Ltd. v. Mort's Dock and Eng'ng. Co. Ltd. (The
Wagon Mound), [1961] A.C. 388.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss4/1
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The odd thing is that almost immediately afterwards the traditional
doctrine-that the defendant must take the plaintiff as he finds him, with
all the plaintiff's predispositions to further unforeseeable damage-was
upheld.21 This seems open to little objection if the predisposition, such as
an allergy, is unknown to the plaintiff also. But there are others that are
known to him, such as the additional loss likely to be caused to a pianist
if his fingers are seriously injured, or the exceptional loss of earning power
likely to be caused by a prolonged recovery to a person whose time is of
exceptional value. Ought the defendant to be saddled with an exceptional
award of damages? Should not the plaintiff in such cases himself cover the
exceptional risk by insurance? It is believed that persons with peculiar
qualifications like the pianist do take out such cover. I understand that
Norwegian law is tending towards holding that damages should always
be assessed on the footing that the plaintiff's earning capacity is that of an
22
average person
The use of limited liability in order to apportion risks may perhaps
be detected in the Dutch draftsmen's treatment of the varying standards
of liability towards persons in different relations towards the possessors
of motor vehicles. 23 It is enough for our purpose to say that it is strictest
towards those who are not engaged in the motor traffic, e.g., pedestrians and
occupiers of property adjoining the highway, less strict towards persons
engaged in the traffic, but outside the possessor's vehicle, and least strict
towards passengers in his vehicle. Towards the first class he will be liable
irrespective of fault, towards the third only if he or his servant is at fault,
towards the intermediate class if in addition the accident has been caused
by a defect in the vehicle. If we think of the proper liability to the general public as being strict, then the limitations of liability found in the
other cases can surely be said to result from the voluntary entry of the
victims into more limited communities to which the possessor of the
vehicle also belongs.
Whether these distinctions are soundly drawn I am by no means
certain; I give them by way of illustration. The nearer all adult members
of the public come to being motorists, the less reason there may be for
treating motorists as a separate category of victim§. Moreover, the more
the use of motor vehicles becomes compulsory if one is to get about at all,
21. Smith v. Leech Brain & Co. Ltd., [1962] 2 Q.B. 409.
22. K. Selmer, Limitation of Damages According To the Circumstances of tke
"Average Citizen," 5
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the less voluntary is the entry of a person into the community of motorists.
The analogy with ship owners becomes remote, and with contracting parties even more remote.
We have been dealing here with the liability of users of dangerous
things or of those who engage in ultra-hazardous activities. The normal
basis of liability for accidents is negligence, which implies a limitation
of liability. That again may be regarded as consequent on a recognition
that both plaintiff and defendant are members of a community, all of whom
stand to gain from the operation in question if carefully performed. It
is well known that the full development of liability for negligent damage
had to wait until the use of fast means of transportation and dangerous
mechanical means of production became not only innocent but essential
to an advanced industrial economy. If the general public stood to gain
from such dangerous activities, it seemed fair that its members should
assume the reasonable risks involved in them. Later on, new forms of
insurance were invented to soften the blow; but where accidents cannot
easily be classified, so that their incidence cannot be statistically determined,
or where the cost of insurance cannot be fairly spread among the members
of an ascertainable community, liability insurance is difficult to arrange.
That is where accident insurance must take up the slack; and, oddly
enough, there seems to be no great difficulty in arranging cover, for a
proper premium, up to defined amounts, whatever the cause of the damage.
Clearly, we have now moved a long way from our starting point.
From immunities enjoyed by judgment debtors, such as the homestead
privilege, we progressed to limitations on the amount that a debtor can
be adjudged to pay of a debt that he has incurred. We have seen that
such limitations are common in contract, and are usually to be explained
by saying that the creditor gave credit either to an account rather than
to the debtor personally, or to an artificial person such as a corporation
interposed between the creditor and the natural persons in whose interest
the debt was incurred. We have also seen that limitations can be deprived
of their effect by the creditor's insisting on security, one form of which
may be the unlimited personal liability of the debtor.
When we came to tort, we left a field in which risks can be apportioned by the parties and entered one in which they must be apportioned
by the law. We found that where a person's liability was mitigated, the
limitation of liability was effected by various means, not always ostensibly
directed to that end. Occasionally it is left, or it is suggested that it be
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss4/1
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left, to the discretion of the judge. Everywhere, I believe, limitation flows
from common membership of plaintiff and defendant in a community. The
general insistence in ordinary cases, on negligence as a basis of liability
results from their common membership in the general public, which has a
deep interest in the use of dangerous things and dangerous methods. Other
limitations result from voluntary entry into a more restricted community
with known specialized risks, which can be covered by insurance. Whether
the appropriate form of insurance is liability or accident insurance is
determined in some cases tentatively and even roughly, in others with
considerable refinements. It is becoming the main object of the law of torts.
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